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TITLE VII IMPACT ANALYSIS APPLIED TO THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: IS A
TRANSPLANT APPROPRIATE?
Mack A. Player*
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and a number
of courts have held that "impact analysis," developed by the Su-
preme Court in Title VII litigation, should be utilized when em-
ployer actions are challenged under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act. Under Title VII if plaintiff establishes that an
employment practice has an adverse impact on a class of persons
protected by that statute, the burden is shifted to defendant to prove
that the challenged practice is "necessary." Failure of defendant to
carry the relatively heavy burden of proving "business necessity" will
result in a judgment for plaintiff. Professor Player suggests that the
"business necessity" burden is not appropriate in Age Act litigation,
and proposes that if a practice has an adverse impact on persons
within the protected age group the defendant should not be held to
be in violation of the Act if the challenged practice is age neutral
and "reasonable."
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). 1
G enerally stated, the ADEA prohibits age discrimination in the
employment relationship by private and public2 employers,3 la-
*Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. The 1974 Amendments to the ADEA made state and local governments de-
fined "employers." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Agencies of the fed-
eral government are specifically excluded as defined "employers" under § 630(b)(2).
29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (Supp. V 1981) provides, however, that "[a]U personnel actions
affecting [federal] employees or applicants for [federal] employment who are at least
40 years of age ... shall be made free from any discrimination based on age." Sepa-
rate procedures are provided for enforcing federal employer rights. See 29 U.S.C. §
633a(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The applicability of the ADEA to state and local
governments is constitutional. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) defines employer as "a person engaged in an industry af-
fecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year .... "
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bor organizations4 and employment agencies.' This protection, how-
ever, is granted only to individuals between the ages of 40 and 70.8
That is, the ADEA protects a person between the ages of 40 and 70
against all forms of age-based employment discrimination by em-
ployers, unions or employment agencies. Thus, persons under age 40
or over age 70 fall outside of the ADEA's protection, and employer's
and unions are free to make age-based distinctions with respect to
such persons.
The ADEA provides certain express defenses to age distinctions.
An employer can make age distinctions when age is a "bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of the particular business."'7 An employer may make benefit dis-
tinctions pursuant to a bona fide retirement and insurance benefit
program, provided that such a plan is not used as a basis for invol-
untary retirement before the age of 70 or as a rationale for refusing
to employ an applicant.8 Employers and unions may also recognize
4. Id. at § 630(d) & (e) which provide that a union needs generally to have
twenty-five or more members and be certified or acting as an employee
representative.
5. Id. at § 630(c), which defines "employment agency" as "any person regularly
undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an employer
6. Id. at § 631(a) (Supp. V 1981).
7. Id. at § 623(f)(1)(1976). In Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977) the
court stated that:
[Tihe burden is on the employer to show (1) that the BFOQ is reasonably
necessary to the essence of its business . . . and (2) that the employer has a
reasonable cause, i.e., a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all
persons within the class . . . would be unable to perform safely and efficiently
the duties of the job involved, or that it is impossible or impractical to deal
with persons over the age limit on an individualized basis.
Id. at 1271. Cf. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974). As applied
to mandatory age limit on hiring pilots, compare Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc.
661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981) (BFOQ not established), with Murnane v. American Air-
lines, 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(BFOQ established). As to mandatory retirement of
pilots prior to age 70, compare Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842 (6th Cir.
1982)(BFOQ at age 60 not established) with Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. TWA, 30 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 33,298 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) and Hollelman v. Conservation Dep't, 30
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1104 (W.D. Mo. 1982)(BFOQ established). As applied to
firefighters, see Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't., 697 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1983).
See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1982); Player, Defenses Under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act: Misinterpretation, Misdirection and the 1978 Amend-
ments, 12 GA. L. REV. 747, 751-67 (1978).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. V. 1981). An exception to the prohibition on
mandatory retirement is imposed upon bona fide executives over the age of 65 who
1262 [Vol. 14
HeinOnline  -- 14 U. Tol. L. Rev. 1262 1982-1983
AGE DISCRIMINATION
and apply bona fide seniority systems.'
B. Historical Background of the ADEA
The ADEA shares a heritage with Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.10 During the Congressional debates on Title VII, it was
suggested that age be included along with race, sex, national origin
and religion as one of the proscribed criteria in that statute. That
suggestion was rejected in favor of a specific directive to the Secre-
tary of Labor to undertake a study of age discrimination and report
back to the Congress with recommendations. 1 The Report, The
Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment (1965),
along with subsequent legislation drafted by Congress, served as the
basis for the ADEA."2 Thus, the operative substantive prohibitions
received vested retirement of at least $27,000 annually. Id. at § 631(c) (Supp. V 1981).
See Zises v. Prudential Ins. Co., 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1218 (D. Mass.
1982). The prohibitions against involuntary retirement made pursuant to a plan was
enacted through a 1978 Amendment to the ADEA. This amendment was a reaction to
the Supreme Court's decision in United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977),
which had permitted such retirement.
Effective January 1, 1983, the following proviso was added to the ADEA:
(g)(1) For purposes of this section, any employer must provide that any em-
ployee aged 65 through 69 shall be entitled to coverage under any group health
plan offered to such employees under the same conditions as any employee
under age 65.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "group health plan" has the
meaning given to such term in section 162(i)(2) of Title 26.
29 U.S.C.A. § 623(g) (West Supp. 1983). For discussion of the permissible distinctions
that may be made in employee benefit plans, see 29 C.F.R. § 860.120 (1982). Gener-
ally stated, benefits may be reduced on the basis of an employee's age, so long as that
reduction is based on actuarial costs. An employee cannot be compelled, however, to
make greater contributions in order to retain the same benefits. 29 C.F.R. §
860.120(d)(4)(i) (1982); Alford v. City of Lubbock, 664 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1982); C.
SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION, § 11.5 (1980).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. V 1981). See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456
U.S. 273 (1982) (interpreting a similar provision of Title VII); California Brewers
Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598 (1980); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). See also Morelock v. NCR Corp., 586 F.2d 1096 (6th Cir.
1978) (ADEA interpretations); Hodgson v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 329 F.
Supp. 225 (D. Minn. 1971); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.8 (1982).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265 (1964);
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 606, 80 Stat. 830,
845 (1966).
12. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1057-58 (1983); see generally EEOC,
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of the ADEA were drawn directly from Title VII."3 The two major
defenses set forth in the ADEA and Title VII, bona fide occupa-
tional qualification and seniority, are phrased in virtually identical
terms." There are, however, differences between Title VII and the
ADEA. The most dramatic involve procedures 15 and remedies." For
example, the ADEA provides for trial by jury; 7 Title VII does not.'
Yet, not all of the differences between the two statutes are "techni-
cal" or "procedural." Unlike Title VII, the ADEA specifically allows
distinctions to be based on bona fide benefit plans. 9 Additionally,
the ADEA, using language from the Equal Pay Act,20 permits dis-
tinctions based on "reasonable factors other than age, '2 1 and allows
discipline for "good cause."22 Title VII, however, does not make such
allowances.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (1981).
13. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (1976) with 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1976).
14. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) and (h) (1976) with 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)
and (2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
15. The ADEA incorporates the enforcement procedures of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 216 & 217 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), [hereinafter cited as
FLSA], into § 626(d). The ADEA further provides that charges must be filed with the
EEOC within 180 days after the unlawful practice or 300 days if there is a local
agency empowered to enforce local age proscriptions. The charging party must also
file with any such local agency. Before suit is filed the charging party must simply
wait 60 days. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979). Title VII has
substantially different filing requirements including an obligation to secure from the
EEOC a "notice of right to sue." Suit must be filed within 90 days of the receipt of
this notice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976). For a general summary, see M. PLAYER, FED-
ERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN A NUTSHELL 228-44, 282, 290 (2d ed.
1981).
16. The ADEA utilization of FLSA enforcement procedures allows collection of
liquidated damages for willful violations. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). Only equitable
relief is available under Title VII. Pearson v. Western Electric Co., 542 F.2d 1150
(10th Cir. 1976).
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (Supp. V 1981).
18. Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
20. 29'U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). The Equal Pay Act was the 1963 amendment to
the FLSA and it prohibited discrimination in pay on the basis of sex between men
and women performing "equal work".
21. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)(1976).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (1976 Supp. V 1981).
1264 [Vol. 14
HeinOnline  -- 14 U. Tol. L. Rev. 1264 1982-1983
AGE DISCRIMINATION
C. The Issue
If a plaintiff between the ages of 40 and 70 can establish that a
particular employment action was "because of" or motivated by age
considerations, such action will constitute a violation of the ADEA.2"
There are various ways to prove age motivation. The plaintiff may
have direct evidence drawn from notations on employment files, 4
public statements,25 or published advertisements.2 6 A plaintiff might
be able to gather statistical data which indicates that particular em-
ployment decisions could not have been made without consideration
of the age of the employees adversely affected.17 In the absence of
direct or statistical proof of discriminatory motives, a plaintiff also
may be able to create an inference of age motivation through proof
of objective facts.2 8 In each case, motive is the key element of the
23. See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979). The operative
language of the ADEA provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or oth-
erwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
age.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)6(2)(1976).
24. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975); Hodgson v. First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
25. Robb v. Chemetron Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1535 (S.D. Tex.
1978); cf. Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1980).
26. Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
27. EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1980); Walker v. Pettit Const.
Co. 605 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1979); See also Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's
Union, Local Union No. 30, 694 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1982); cf. Lindsey v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1977).
28. "[A] plaintiff may establish a prima facie case ... by showing (1) that he or
she is within the protected age group, (2) that he or she met applicable job qualifica-
tions, (3) that despite these qualifications, he or she was discharged, and (4) that
after the discharge the position remained open." Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 574
F.2d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1978). Accord: Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1981);
Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979). This showing creates an infer-
ence of age motivation, shifting an evidentiary burden to defendant to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its treatment of plaintiff. If defendant fails
to carry this burden of presenting a legitimate reason, the inference of age motivation
has not been refuted and plaintiff will be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Lovelace v. Sherwin Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1982); Douglas v. Anderson,
656 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1980). For a more
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plaintiff's case.
One critical issue presented by ADEA litigation, however, is
whether a defendant can utilize bona fide age-neutral factors that
have an adverse impact on the protected age group. That is, absent
any proof of improper motivation, does evidence that a selection de-
j. ~Kvice or criteria has an unjustified adverse impact on persons between
the ages of 40 and 70 constitute a violation of the ADEA?
To illustrate, assume that an employer imposes on all employees
certain physical qualifications. The evidence indicates that the em-
ployer's goal is to improve the health and performance of his work
force and not to harm any age class. Assume further that these
physical qualifications have an adverse impact on persons over age
40. That is, persons over age 40 fail to meet the standards much
more frequently than do persons under age 40. Assume further that
the employer is unable to show that the particular job duties require
the level of physical qualifications that are imposed on the employ-
ees. In short, good physical condition may be rational and imposed
in good faith. Nonetheless, the physical requirements may not be
necessary or directly related to job performance. Would such a fact
pattern establish a violation of the ADEA?
Using another example, assume that an employer imposes an ob-
jective pen and paper test. Perhaps because of test wisdom or their
more recent exposure to formal education, it is proved that persons
under age 40 perform significantly better on the test than do per-
sons over age 40. As a result, the younger applicants are selected at
a rate significantly higher than the older applicants. Assume, too,
that the employer can establish good faith in imposing the examina-
tion. For example, the employer may legitimately desire a more
highly sophisticated workforce. Nevertheless, the employer is unable
to prove that the examination relates in any precise way to actual or
projected performance on the particular job. In short, the test mea-
sures general knowledge, but does not predict specific ability to per-
form job duties. Would this test violate the ADEA?
To be sure, if these cases arose in a Title VII context, a violation
would exist. "Congress directed the thrust of the Act [Title VII] to
the consequences of employment practices not simply the motiva-
comprehensive discussion, see Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the
ADEA, 17 GA. L. REV. 621 (1983).
Thus, the courts have adopted, with adaptations, the approach utilized in Title
VII litigation. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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tion." Title VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination, but it also
forbids practices that are fair in form, yet discriminatory in opera-
tion. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment prac-
tice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be re-
lated to job performance, the practice is prohibited. . . . [G]ood
intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employ-
ment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability." 9 Thus, the unresolved issue is whether a similar conclu-
sion would or should be reached under the ADEA?
II. THE TITLE VII MODEL: AN OVERVIEW OF IMPACT ANALYSIS
A. Neutral Standards: Inherently Discriminatory
The earliest cases arising under Title VII involved criteria that
were neutral on their face but, as applied to a particular employer's
work force, necessarily produced a non-neutral or racially discrimi-
natory result. For example, an employer with a work force tradition-
ally segregated into two units according to race imposes a rule
prohibiting transfers between units. The neutral "no transfer" rule
is inherently and necessarily discriminatory on the basis of race be-
cause it perpetuates existing patterns of segregation."0 A union with
all white membership or an employer with white management gives
preference to family members. Although neutral on its face, such
nepotism necessarily has a discriminatory effect."1 There is no need
to present statistics. The result is a necessary and unavoidable con-
sequence of the criteria. The criteria, therefore, cannot be consid-
ered truly neutral. Only if the employer could show the business ne-
cessity of such an inherently discriminatory criteria would the courts
permit its use.32
29. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
30. Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970); Quarles
v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
31. United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, Int'l Ass'n, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123
(8th Cir. 1969); Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers
v. Volgler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1967). See also Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co.,
697 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1983).
32. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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B. Neutral Standards: Adverse Impact
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.38 addressed the utilization of stan-
dards which were not inherently tied to a proscribed classification,
but only through statistical proof could it be shown that the criteria
in fact adversely affected a protected class. The employer in Griggs
utilized two different criteria in making employment selections. Em-
ployees were required to have a high school diploma and make pass-
ing scores on two nationally developed intelligence tests. Census
data disclosed that 34% of the white males in the state had high
school diplomas compared to only 12% of the black males. Thus,
the neutral rule (high school diploma) had an impact on potential
black applicants at a rate almost three times that of the impact on
potential white applicants. As to the objective tests, an EEOC study
found that 58% of the whites taking a similar test had received a
passing score compared to a success rate of only 6% of blacks. 4
Notwithstanding the impact of these two neutral criteria, the lower
courts found that the employer imposed the requirements in good
faith with no intent to discriminate against black applicants. The
lower courts further concluded that motive was a required element
which plaintiff had the burden of establishing. Consequently, judg-
ment was granted to the defendant. The Supreme Court reversed,
and ruled that motivation was not the controlling factor. The Court
stated that "[t]he true touchstone is business necessity. If an em-
ployment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited." 5
A few years later, the Court, addressing the legality of minimum
height and weight requirements under Title VII refined and clarified
its approach to impact analysis:
[T]o establish a prima facie case of discrimination,, a plaintiff need
only show that the facially neutral standards in question select appli-
cants for hire in a significantly discriminatory pattern. Once it is thus
shown that the employment standards are discriminatory in effect,
the employer must meet "the burden of showing that any given re-
quirement [has] . . .a manifest relationship to the employment in
question." If the employer proves that the challenged requirements
are job related, the plaintiff may then show that other selection de-
33. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
34. Id. at 430 n.6.
35. Id. at 431.
[Vol. 141268
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vices without a similar discriminatory effect would also "serve the em-
ployer's legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy
workmanship." 6
The Court found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie
case of sex discrimination by showing that the physical criteria ex-
cluded from consideration over 41% of the female population of the
United States, while having an adverse effect on less than 1% of the
male population. The Court held that the employer had not met its
burden of showing a "manifest relationship to the employment in
question. 3 7 Arguing that minimum height and weight for a highway
patrol officer would suggest superior strength was inadequate. The
Court suggested that the defendant's burden would be met not by a
showing of reasonableness but only by correlating height and weight
requirements to actual job performances.
In a third major case the Supreme Court addressed the issue:
"What must an employer show to establish that pre-employment
tests racially discriminatory in effect, though not in intent, are suffi-
ciently 'job related' to survive challenge under Title VII?"' ' The
Court indicated that "job relatedness" proof should be guided by
the EEOC Guidelines 9 which the Court held "are 'entitled to great
deference.' ,,o These Guidelines, followed by the Court, require the
defendant to establish a close statistical correlation according to
standards of professional statisticians between performance on the
test and accurately measured job performance. Upon a showing that
the criteria have an adverse impact, the failure of defendant to es-
tablish that statistical correlation will result in a judgment for the
plaintiff."'
36. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (quoting Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425 (1975) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
37. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (quoting Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
38. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 408 (1975).
39. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1607 (1975). The EEOC has since issued new guidelines; the
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978), 29 C.F.R. pt. 1607
(1982).
40. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971)).
41. But see New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), which sug-
gested, simultaneously, a greater burden on plaintiff in establishing the adverse im-
pact of a neutral criterion and a very relaxed burden on defendant in proving "busi-
ness necessity."
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III. THE ISSUE RESOLVED? TRANSPLANTING THE TITLE VII
ADVERSE IMPACT MODEL INTO ADEA LITIGATION
A first impression would lead one to accept that the model for
Title VII impact litigation could be fully employed in age discrimi-
nation cases. The Supreme Court has noted the similarity of the two
statutes in origin, purpose and language.2 Where improperly moti-
vated disparate treatment is at issue in ADEA cases, the lower
courts uniformly have adopted the elements and burdens utilized in
Title VII litigation.4 The EEOC and four courts have boldly and
The application of impact analysis in the lower courts has been far from uniform.
Some courts, following the Griggs example, are willing to infer adverse impact from
relatively general data. See, e.g., Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d
1251 (6th Cir. 1981); Grant v. Bethelem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1980);
Guardians Ass'n of N.Y. City Police Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232
(2d Cir. 1980). Other courts, inspired by Beazer, insist that the plaintiff present more
exacting and precise statistical data. See, e.g., EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698
F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980). In
addressing the employer's burden upon proof of impact some courts, emphasizing the
"necessity" aspects of Griggs, require the employer to demonstrate with persuasive
evidence not only the importance of the business purpose but also the factual proxim-
ity of the discriminatory criteria to that goal. See, e.g., Williams v. Colorado Springs,
Colorado School District #11, 641 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1981); Craig v. County of Los
Angeles, 626 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1980). Other courts, however, are satisfied with a gen-
eral showing of a business relationship between the criteria and some attribute of the
employer's business. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810 (8th
Cir. 1983); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981); Chrisner v.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251 (6th Cir. 1981); Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-
Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977). Some courts have held that defendant's bur-
den of proving "necessity" includes proof that there are no lesser discriminatory al-
ternatives. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971). Such a burden
on the defendant seems clearly improper in light of the Court's statement in Dothard.
See supra text accompanying note 34. Other courts have indicated that the burden of
showing lesser discriminatory alternatives shifts to plaintiff after defendant has es-
tablished the business relationship of the discriminatory criteria. If plaintiff carries
the burden of establishing lesser discriminatory alternatives, the "necessity" of defen-
dant's rule will be destroyed and plaintiff will prevail. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d
1172 (4th Cir. 1982). It is not here the purpose to explore the precise parameters of
plaintiff's burden of proving impact or defendant's burden of showing "necessity."
Rather, the issue is whether future standards, adopted under Title VII, will be appro-
priate for use in ADEA cases.
42. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
575 (1978).
43. Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1983); Cuddy v. Car-
men, 694 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Anderson v. Savage Laboratories, 675 F.2d 1221
(11th Cir. 1982); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027
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broadly announced that impact analysis is appropriate for use under
the ADEA."' Thus, the issue would appear to be well on its way to
being resolved. An examination of whether Title VII standards of
impact and necessity should be completely transplanted into the
ADEA suggests, however, that the issue is not as simple as the
EEOC and courts have indicated.
Evidence of express legislative intent on this matter is meagre.
There is no indication that Congress intended to have the ADEA
proscribe procedures having an adverse impact. Additionally, there
was no discussion of impact analysis in the legislative history of Ti-
tle VII. Nonetheless, the holding in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. was
premised expressly upon a divined legislative intent to outlaw prac-
tices "fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."'5 Hence, given
the silence in the legislative history of Title VII, there is no abstract
reason why such an intent could not be similarly "found" under the
ADEA. However, the very fact that Congress enacted two different
statutes suggests that Congress desired that the two statutes be
given appropriately differing and independent interpretations.' Ar-
guably, if Congress had desired a mirror image analysis, it would
simply have amended Title VII by adding "age" as a proscribed cri-
terion. Congress specifically rejected such a proposal.
The difference in the two statutes is highlighted by the specific
provision in the ADEA permitting employers to make differentia-
tions based on "reasonable factors other than age.""' No such provi-
sion appears in Title VII. Not only does this suggest a different
analysis, the language of the proviso itself specifies that an employer
is authorized to make distinctions using any age neutral factor that
(2d Cir. 1980); Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1980);
Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1980); Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir.
1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979); Schwager v. Sun Oil Co.,
591 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1979); Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958 (8th Cir.
1978).
44. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (1982); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702
F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983); Allison v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 680 F.2d 1319
(11th Cir. 1982); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Bordens,
Inc., 551 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Ariz. 1982). See also Massarsky v. General Motors Corp.,
706 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir. 1983) (assumed without resolving, finding no impact on
older workers).
45. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
46. See Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1982); Mc-
Corstin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1980); Laugesen v. Ana-
conda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976).
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is "reasonable." Regardless of the impact of that factor, if "reasona-
ble," the ADEA, unlike Title VII, specifically authorizes its use.
Thus, to require defendants to prove "business necessity" would
seem to be a burden not authorized under the ADEA.
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the
ADEA's application to state and local governments and suggested
that:
[I]n order to insure that employers were permitted to use neutral cri-
teria not directly dependent on age, and in recognition of the fact that
even criteria that are based on age are occasionally justified, the Act
provided that certain otherwise prohibited employment practices
would not be unlawful "where age is a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age." . . . [T]he State's discretion to achieve its goals in
the way it thinks best is not being overridden entirely, but is merely
being tested against a reasonable federal standard. 8
There are other, more practical, reasons why the ADEA might
not mandate a pure Title VII analysis. The first reason is that un-
like Title VII, the ADEA utilizes trial by jury.4" Impact analysis de-
pends initially upon complex statistical data to prove impact. Gen-
erally, even more complex validation studies are presented through
expert testimony to establish the statistical relationship according to
professional standards between the criteria and job performance.50
Submitting this often conflicting and exceedingly technical data to a
jury with correct instructions could be quite difficult. While effective
evaluation of strict validation might be unmanageable, a standard of
"reasonableness" could be applied by a jury.
Secondly, because a wide-spread application of a particular crite-
ria is being challenged in an adverse impact case, class actions are
particularly appropriate. Indeed, it generally is the class as opposed
to the individuals that complain about the application of the crite-
48. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1058, 1062 (1983)(quoting 29 U.S.C. §
623(f)(1)). The Court also stated: "[T]he State may still, at the very least, assess the
fitness of its game wardens and dismiss those wardens whom it reasonably finds to be
unfit." 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (Supp. V i981); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir.
1975).
50. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Hameed v.
Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 396, 637 F.2d
506 (8th Cir. 1980).
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ria.5 ' However, because the ADEA utilizes enforcement procedures
of the Fair Labor Standards Act,5" and that statute does not allow
unconsented class actions, the ADEA has been interpreted as not
allowing true class actions.55 Thus, challenging a class-wide practice
with non-class action suits would, at best, be awkward and
repetitive.
The uncertainty of whether impact analysis was appropriate
under the ADEA, uncertainty suggested by the language, history
and practicalities of the statute, was reflected in initial official inter-
pretations of the Act. The Department of Labor had statutory au-
thority which it exercised until 1979.1" Pursuant to that authority,
the Secretary of Labor issued interpretative guidelines which stated
that physical fitness requirements had to be "reasonably necessary
for the specific work to be performed."55 This suggested a "business
necessity" standard that was imposed regardless of motivation. As
to objective tests, however, the Secretary of Labor stated that such
tests would "be carefully scrutinized to ensure that the test is for a
permissible purpose and not for purposes prohibited by the stat-
ute." 8 This, of course, suggests that motive is the controlling ele-
ment, and that such tests would be permitted if used for a proper
"purpose".
In 1978, the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Proce-
dures were approved for use by all major federal civil rights enforce-
ment agencies, including the Department of Labor and the EEOC.5 7
These Guidelines set forth in substantial detail the requirements to
prove the adverse impact of selection criteria. 8 They set forth the
standards by which a defendant can establish the validity of selec-
tion criteria that have an adverse impact. 9 These Guidelines ex-
pressly exclude from coverage complaints brought under the
51. See, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 102 S. Ct. 2364 (1982); Johnson v. Geor-
gia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). No member of a class will be
bound unless written consent filed.
53. See, e.g., Franci v. Avco Corp., 460 F. Supp. 389, 399 (D. Conn. 1978);
LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 96 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
54. Reorganization Plan No. 1 (1978), 3 C.F.R. § 321 (1979), transferred the stat-
utory authority of the Department of Labor to the EEOC.
55. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(f)(1)(1982).
56. 29 C.F.R. § 860.104(b)(1982).
57. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1(1982).
58. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3-.4, .15 (1982).
59. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5-.14 (1982).
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ADEA.6 0 This suggests that enforcing agencies had some doubt
about the applicability of impact analysis to the ADEA. And, it is
clear that the Guidelines rejected the "business necessity" standards
of "work relatedness" utilized in Title VII litigation.
The EEOC recently made a significant change of course. Its new
guidelines provide:
(d) When an employment practice, including a test, is claimed as a
basis for different treatment of employees or applicants for employ-
ment on the grounds that it is a "factor other than" age, and such a
practice has an adverse impact on individuals within the protected
age group, it can only be justified as a business necessity. Tests which
are asserted as "reasonable factors other than age" will be scrutinized
in accordance with the standards set forth at Part 1607 of this Title.
[Uniform Guidelines].6"
The position of the EEOC that ADEA litigation may employ im-
pact analysis, including the Title VII requirement that criteria ad-
versely impacting on the protected group must be validated in terms
of "business necessity" has received support from four circuits.
The Second Circuit, in Geller v. Markham, became the first
court to adopt this position.2 Geller involved the refusal of the
school board to hire a fifty-year-old teacher for a vacancy ultimately
filled by a twenty-five-year-old applicant. The reason given by the
defendant for not hiring the plaintiff was a board of education pol-
icy that new appointments be made from among qualified teachers
who had less than five years teaching experience. This policy of
favoring the inexperienced teacher was an effort to save salary ex-
penditures. The court admitted evidence that 92.6% of the teachers
in the state over age 40 would be affected by the preference, while
only 62% of those under 40 would be similarly disadvantaged. The
court held that this evidence established a prima facie case of illegal
discrimination, and shifted the burden to the defendant of showing
that the "practice is justified by business necessity or need and is
related to successful performance of the job for which the practice is
used."6 8 The court held that group-based cost justifications would
not meet the burden of proving the "necessity" of the practice.6
60. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1982).
61. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d)(1982).
62. 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980).
63. Id. at 1032.
64. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h)(1982)(Department of Labor Guidelines): "[A]
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The Second Circuit gave no reason why impact analysis with its
"business necessity" component should be applied to ADEA cases.
The court was content to rely on the broad statements from the Su-
preme Court in Lorillard v. Pons" that "[t]he [substantive] prohibi-
tions of the ADEA were derived in haec verbe from Title VII."" /
In a similar case from the Eighth Circuit, Leftwich v. Harris-
Stowe State College, 7 the defendant was a successor, reorganized
college, which was reducing the size of its faculty. To accomplish
this personnel reduction and to reduce costs, a plan specified the
particular number of untenured faculty to be retained. Statistics in-
dicated that the typical tenured faculty member was more than ten
years older than the typical non-tenured faculty member. Thus, the
court concluded that the denial of an appointment to a tenured
faculty applicant based on this preference had an adverse impact on
the protected age class. The court then stated that the defendant's
burden was to show that the selection plan had "'a manifest rela-
tion to the employment in question,' [and] that there [was] a 'com-
pelting need to maintain that practice.' "68 Like the Second Circuit
in Geller, the Eighth Circuit rejected as illegitimate the asserted de-
sire to save resources. The court also rejected the articulated need to
have the flexibility to hire non-tenured faculty. Finally, the sugges-
tion that tenured faculty tended to be more stagnant than non-ten-
ured faculty, with non-tenured teachers being more productive, was
rejected as being inherently illegitimate. The court held that such an
assumption perpetuated the very stereotypical thinking about the
worth of older workers that the statute was attempting to remedy.
The Eleventh Circuit in Allison v. Western Union Telegraph
Co.ss was the third circuit to announce that it was following Title
VII impact analysis. The court, however, offered absolutely no rea-
sons for its view that the ADEA should follow Title VII in this re-
general assertion that the average cost of employing older workers as a group is
higher than the average cost of employing younger workers as a group will not be
recognized . . ."; 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(f)(1982)(EEOC Guidelines): "A differentiation
based on the average cost of employing older employees as a group is unlawful except
with respect to employee benefit plans which qualify for the section 4(f)(2) exception
to the Act."
65. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
66. 635 F.2d at 1032 (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)).
67. 702 F.2d 686, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,429 (8th Cir. 1983).
68. Id. at 692 (quoting Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 815 (8th
Cir. 1983)).
69. 680 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir. 1982).
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gard. In a very short opinion, the court simply ruled that plaintiff
had failed to establish as a matter of law that the subjective criteria
of which he was complaining had been proved to have an adverse
impact on him or older workers."0
In Massarsky v. General Motors Corp.,701 the Third Circuit
raised the issue of whether impact analysis was appropriate under
the ADEA, but elected not to resolve the issue. The court concluded
that a preference for trainees in assigning order of lay-off was not
proved to have an adverse impact on workers over 40.
A number of observations can be made about the three circuit
court cases that addressed the issue. First, none of the courts en-
gaged in any significant analysis of the issue. The courts did not
even appear to be aware of the unique statutory language of the
ADEA ("reasonable factors other than age") that might dictate an
analysis that differs from Title VII.
Second, the three cases were essentially disparate treatment
cases. Indeed, they could have been and were resolved solely under
traditional disparate treatment motivational analysis. Thus, the dis-
cussion of adverse impact was unnecessary to their resolution. In
Geller and Leftwich, cases which ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, an
individual or a small group of plaintiffs were denied employment
opportunities. Each plaintiff established a prima facie case of dispa-
rate treatment that was improperly motivated. In each case, the rea-
son articulated by the defendant was rejected as not being a "legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason," because it was largely age-based,
relied on group costs, or depended upon stereotypical assumptions
as to the worth of workers. Although a uniform "rule" was applied,
disparate treatment analysis was still appropriate. 7' The Allison
court, which ruled in favor of the defendant, addressed the applica-
tion of a subjective standard utilized to determine the order of lay-
offs. Substantial authority has held that impact analysis is only ap-
plicable to broad-based objective rules that affect a broad class of
70. A district court in Arizona also applied impact analysis to a severance plan
that denied to employees who could claim retirement at age 55 severance pay that
would be granted to all employees not eligible to retire. This denial of severance pay
by those over 55 who were retiring was challenged. The court held that such a plan
had a disparate impact upon those over 55. Indeed, the age factor was virtually on the
face of the classification. The court concluded that defendant must prove the busi-
ness necessity of the plan and had failed to do so. EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 551 F.
Supp. 1095 (D. Ariz. 1982).
70.1 706 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1983).
71. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
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actual or potential applicants and should not be utilized when the
criteria are individualized and subjective. 2 Thus, perhaps any allu-
sion to impact doctrines was not only unnecessary, but would have
been misdirected. Furthermore, like its two sister circuits, the Elev-
enth Circuit resolved the case utilizing traditional disparate treat-
ment analysis. The court found that notwithstanding the prima fa-
cie case of illegal age motivation, reliance upon subjective criteria
was a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." Thus, in these cases,
impact analysis was not necessary for satisfactory resolution of the
claims. Each case could have been appropriately analyzed in terms
of motivation, and the result reached would have been unchanged.
Finally, none of the three circuit courts was presented with a
pure impact case. The Eleventh Circuit's facts involved subjective
criteria. Not only is impact analysis arguably inappropriate, 8 the
court found that no adverse impact had been proved.74 The other
courts dealt with factual patterns that were inherently based on age.
The Eighth Circuit was addressing a tenure disqualification, a factor
inherently tied to the age of the possessor. The Second Circuit was
addressing experience-similarly a factor that cannot be divorced
from age. Both factors were functions of time. As functions of time
they must also be inherently related to age. When such a time factor
is utilized in reverse to disqualify those who possess the time quali-
ties, such a factor necessarily will harm older persons (they are the
ones with the most seniority or experience). Thus, it is not a ques-
tion of proving impact from a truly neutral criteria. Instead, these
cases involved a simple recognition that a time factor is inherently
tied to age. Consequently, these cases fall more appropriately into
the category of cases that pre-dated Griggs v. Duke Power Co., cases
which analyzed facially neutral but inherently discriminatory race
factors." These inherently discriminatory factors were not permit-
ted because they were not truly neutral, but were the necessary
product of race. The same analysis is appropriate in ADEA cases:
There is no need to address impact or necessity of the time factors
because, in reality, time factors are necessarily based on age. As time
factors are not age-neutral, they cannot be "factors other than age"
72. EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 638-39 (4th Cir.
1983); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 668 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1982);
Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 651 F.2d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1981).
73. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
74. 680 F.2d at 1322.
75. See supra notes 24 & 30 and accompanying text.
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as the ADEA defense requires.7 6
There is no reason to criticize the results reached by the three
circuits. Their ultimate conclusions are sound. It should be recog-
nized, however, that the courts have yet to address a true impact
case, a case involving the utilization of a truly age neutral criteria
such as an objective employment test. Moreover, the EEOC Guide-
lines for the ADEA, which require validation according to the Uni-
form Guidelines on Employment Selection, have not been tested in
court. When that situation is presented, the courts should address
the issue anew, and not superficially accept the overly-broad state-
ments from existing authority that impact analysis in all its aspects
is appropriate and should be applied under the ADEA.
IV. A SUGGESTED ANALYSIS
The ADEA specifically permits employers to utilize "reasonable
factors other than age."'77 That language is not in Title VII and
should not be ignored when analyzing ADEA violations. If an em-
ployer utilizes factors that are inherently time-based, such as experi-
ence, years on the job, and tenure, those factors are inherently age-
related and thus cannot be considered "factors other than age."'17
When faced with truly neutral criteria, the first problem will be
to determine if the criteria have an adverse impact on persons in the
protected age group. If such impact is proved, there is nothing in the
language or history of the ADEA that would prohibit a finding that
this impact creates a prima facie showing of illegal discrimination.79
To this extent, the Title VII model is appropriate, notwithstanding
some unique problems under the ADEA. The burden that shifts to
the defendant, however, cannot be one of "business necessity." Since
the ADEA specifically permits use of "reasonable factors other than
age," the defendant's burden should be no greater than establishing
76. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)(1976).
77. Id.
78. Seniority is a time factor but the Act specifically allows the employer to util-
ize bona fide seniority systems. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(1976).
79. This prima facie case may be stated in terms of Griggs v. Duke Power, that it
is the consequences, not solely the intent, of employment practices that the ADEA is
designed to eliminate. Or, just as appropriately the prima facie case may be analyzed
in terms of inferred intent. A significant impact carries with it an inference of im-
proper motivation. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); NLRB
v. Erie Resistor Co., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). In either case the burden shifts to defen-
dant, which if not met will entitle plaintiff to a judgment. Cf. Note, Age Discrimina-
tion and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REV. 837 (1982).
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that it has applied an age neutral factor that is "reasonable." To
impose a greater burden would be to deprive defendant of a statuto-
rily granted defense.
There is little doubt that "reasonable factors other than age"
should be treated as a defense. It is structurally so arranged in the
statute, and other similarly arranged provisions have been treated as
defenses.80 As a defense, the burden is upon defendant to establish:
(1) the factual existence of the "factor," (2) its "reasonableness,"
and (3) its age neutrality."1 The defendant's burden is one of persua-
sion, to be distinguished from the evidentiary burden of simply
presenting some evidence of the existence of the factor.8 2
The term "reasonable factor" may not be easy to define. It would
seem that such a term demands less of a showing than would be
required to prove "business necessity." First, "necessity" suggests a
certain balancing that reaches a level of "compelling."83 A factor
could be deemed reasonable under a less demanding standard.
Nonetheless, a "reasonable factor other than age" has more of a sub-
stantive content than simple "legitimacy."8 4 Thus reasonableness
would seem to require a "middle tier" showing somewhere between
these two extremes. It presupposes a form of business rationality, a
demonstration of a factual relationship between the "factor" and
bona fide business purposes.85 Thus, upon a showing of substantial
80. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977) (Benefit Plans);
Marshall v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 591 (5th Cir. 1978).
81. Utilizing impact analysis under Title VII, the courts have generally agreed
that the defendant's burden of proving "business necessity" is in the nature of a "de-
fense" in that defendant carries a burden of establishing the "necessity". Wright v.
Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's Inc., 657 F.2d 750,
753 (5th Cir. 1981); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir.
1981).
82. Compare Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24
(1978) with Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). In
disparate treatment cases, upon plaintiff's presentation of a prima facie case of illegal
motivation the burden is shifted to defendant to "articulate a legitimate, nondiscrim-
inatory reason" for its action. This burden is to present admissible evidence that
would justify a finding on behalf of defendant; it is not a burden to convince the fact
finder that the articulated reason motivated the defendant's action. The courts have
distinguished the burdens in an adverse impact case from the burden required of
defendant when the issue is motivation. See Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 657 F.2d
750, 752 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981).
83. See, e.g., Green v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
84. See Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
85. Perhaps the closest analogy would be the standard applied in constitutional
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adverse impact of a particular factor, the defendant in an ADEA
case must prove more than that the reason exists and is "rational."
Defendant's burden is to prove that the reason is age neutral and
serves an identified business purpose. Defendant, however, should
not be required to show that the weight of the reason reaches the
level of being "compelling."
The term "necessity" also presupposes the absence of alternative
devices that would accomplish the business objective with less of a
discriminatory effect. If a lesser discriminatory alternative is availa-
ble, then the "factor" utilized could not be "necessary."06 Moreover,
because the employer could have utilized alternative devices does
not, in itself, require a finding that the factor utilized was unreason-
able. A reason could still be reasonable, even in the presence of
other, lesser discriminatory alternatives.8 " The presence of lesser
discriminatory devices might be some evidence of unreasonableness,
or it might suggest that the use of the factor was pretextual, but a
lesser discriminatory alternative does not, as a matter of law, require
the rejection of an otherwise "reasonable factor other than age."
Support for this interpretation of the ADEA comes from an anal-
ysis of the Equal Pay Act.8 8 That statute permits pay distinctions
between men and women performing equal work if the difference is
based on any "factor other than sex."8 9 That phrase was obviously
the inspiration for the similar ADEA defense, and thus, a similar
interpretation would seem appropriate. The Supreme Court ana-
lyzed the "factor other than sex" provision of the Equal Pay Act,
litigation to classifications according to sex. The state's burden is to "establish that
the classification by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976). This "factual relationship" test is to be distinguished from the
mere rationality test which will suffice to sustain ordinary economic legislation. Fer-
guson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). It also differs from the "strict scrutiny" stan-
dard, which is applied to suspect classifications and those classifications infringing
upon fundamental liberties. In such cases, the state must prove the classification to
be "necessary" to serve "compelling governmental interests". Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The weak rationality test
could be analogized to the Title VII concept of "legitimacy". The "strict scrutiny"
standard is quite close to that of "business necessity". See Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976). The suggested standard for "reasonable factors other than age" is
close to the middle tier "factual relationship" test.
86. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3B
(1982).
87. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1976).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv)(1976).
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and held that it should be treated as an affirmative defense. Conse-
quently, it was the defendant who was obligated to carry the burden
of establishing that the factor utilized was entirely sex neutral."'
The Supreme Court also interpreted the content of "factor other
than sex" in County of Washington v. Gunther,91 and indicated that
impact analysis with its "business necessity" component would not
be appropriate under the Equal Pay Act. The Court was addressing
the relationship between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act as estab-
lished in the so-called "Bennett Amendment." '2 The Court held that
pay distinctions could violate Title VII without there being a viola-
tion of the Equal Pay Act and observed that:
Title VII's prohibitions of discriminatory employment practices was
intended to be broadly inclusive, proscribing "not only overt discrimi-
nation but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co. . . . The structure of Title VII
litigation, including presumptions, burdens of proof, and defenses, has
been designed to reflect this approach. The fourth affirmative defense
of the Equal Pay Act [,"factors other than sex"], however, was
designed differently, to confine the application of the Act to wage dif-
ferentials attributable to sex discrimination. . . . Equal Pay Act liti-
gation, therefore, has been structured to permit employers to defend
against charges of discrimination where their pay differentials are
based on bona fide use of "factors other than sex." Under the Equal
Pay Act, the courts and administrative agencies are not permitted to
"substitute their judgment for the judgment of the employer ... who
has established and applied a bona fide job rating system," so long as
it does not discriminate on the basis of sex.98
90. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
91. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). The "Bennett Amendment" to Title VII
provides:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this [title] for any em-
ployer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the
wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if
such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of [The Equal Pay Act).
Id.
93. 452 U.S. at 170-71 (citations omitted). The Court was addressing the precise
issue of whether in light of the "Bennett Amendment", 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) a pay
differential that would not violate the Equal Pay Act could ever be a violation of
Title VII. The Court held that a Title VII claim could be stated if a pay differential
between sexes performing "unequal jobs" was based upon intentional discrimination.
The Court interpreted the "Bennett Amendment" not as incorporating into Title VII
the "equal work" standard of the Equal Pay Act, but as permitting as a defense wage
distinctions actually "authorized" by the Equal Pay Act. The Court held that a dis-
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Thus, "factors other than sex" is considered much less of a bur-
den than "business necessity." At the same time, however, the Court
indicated that arbitrary reasons would not carry the employer's bur-
den of proving a "factor other than sex". The Gunther Court re-
quired that the "factor" be "bona fide" and sex neutral. In a previ-
ous case, which arose under the Equal Pay Act, the Court had
similarly indicated that mere economic considerations would not
suffice, particularly if those considerations had any genesis in sex
segregation.' 4 Hence, "the burden. . . is one which cannot be satis-
fied by general or conclusory assertions. '95 Lower courts have
elaborated:
The Equal Pay Act concerns business practices. It would be nonsensi-
cal to sanction the use of a factor that rests on some consideration
unrelated to business. An employer thus cannot use a factor which
causes a wage differential between male and female employees absent
an acceptable business reason."
The Department of Labor, which enforced the Equal Pay Act
until 1979, takes the position that to qualify as a "factor other than
sex" there must be a "relationship to the requirements of the job or
the individual's performance on the job. .. .
When this standard is applied to a training program, for the pro-
gram to be considered a "factor other than sex" justifying premium
pay to males, the employer must establish not only the sex neutral
character of the program, but also, the employer must show that the
tinction would be "authorized" by the Equal Pay Act only if it fell within one of the
four specified defenses. In making the statement set forth above in the text the Court
was addressing an argument made by the dissent that if the "Bennett Amendment"
was so limited it was made superfluous because Equal Pay Act defenses were already
and necessarily Title VII defenses. The Court was countering this argument by point-
ing out that absent the "Bennett Amendment" proof of the adverse impact of a sys-
tem would have to be justified by proof of the system's "business necessity." The
"Bennett Amendment's" incorporation of the Equal Pay Act defenses allows an em-
ployer to defend a distinction by showing that it was a bona fide factor other than
sex, a burden that is significantly lighter, the court held, than proving its "necessity."
In this way the "Bennett Amendment," as construed, continued to have some vitality.
94. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974). See also City of
Los Angeles Dep't. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 717 n.32 (1978).
95. Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 1970).
96. Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982).
97. 29 C.F.R. § 800.149 (1982). The EEOC now enforces the Equal Pay Act by
virtue of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. § 321 (1979).
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program actually serves its stated purpose of providing significant
job-related skills training." Similarly, an employer who desires to
rely on a merit system to justify pay distinctions must show that the
system is bona fide and does in fact measure relative merit in terms
of business goals." Educational attainments and prior experience
can be considered as "factors other than sex" even though they are
not validated in terms of "business necessity." However, they must
be "related to the responsibilities and duties the employee must
perform." 100
Thus, under the Equal Pay Act a standard of "business neces-
sity" has been rejected as an equivalent to the "factor other than
sex" defense. The courts have adopted a standard of "business ra-
tionality," a standard that falls short of the "business necessity" re-
quirement of Title VII, yet requires more of a showing than simple
legitimacy or abstract reasonableness.1 01 A similar application of the
similar defense, "reasonable factor other than age," would seem ap-
propriate under the ADEA. Such an application would be consistent
with the precise language and purposes of the ADEA. And, the stat-
utory parallel to the defense of "factor other than sex" in the Equal
Pay Act provides more direction than anything found in the silence
of Title VII. This interpretation is more consistent with the earlier
and presumably reliable agency interpretations. Finally, the stan-
dard of "business reasonableness" provides a practical talisman for
analysis by a jury that avoids the hyper-technical proof that is an
earmark of non-jury Title VII impact cases.102
98. Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v.
Security National Bank of Sioux City, 460 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1972); Shultz v. First
Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969).
99. EEOC v. Aetna Ins. Co., 616 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1980); Kouba v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982); Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896
(5th Cir. 1974).
100. Strecker v. Grand Forks County Social Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96, 100 (8th Cir.
1980). See the dissenting opinion of Judge Heaney, who argued for a stringent stan-
dard of job relatedness. 640 F.2d at 104. (Heaney, J., dissenting); EEOC v. First Citi-
zen Bank of Billings, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCN) 33,508 (D.C. Mont. 1983).
101. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. See generally 29 C.F.R. §§
800.143- .151 (1982).
102. This concept of reasonableness tied to job relatedness was recently sug-
gested by the Court in the ADEA case of EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
The EEOC and a few courts have boldly announced that impact
analysis drawn from Title VII litigation should be applied in ADEA
litigation. If the adverse impact on persons over age 40 can be estab-
lished, the burden is upon the defendant to prove the "business ne-
cessity" of its selection criteria. Those announcements have ignored
the specific statutory language in the ADEA which permits an em-
ployer to utilize "reasonable factors other than age." By adopting
the Title VII requirement of "business necessity," the EEOC and
the courts are suggesting a higher burden of defendants than au-
thorized by the statute. Although the courts thus far have been es-
sentially correct in their ultimate conclusions-the factors employed
by defendants were inherently time factors and thus would not qual-
ify as "factors other than age"-they were incorrect in assuming the
burden that an employer should carry is the heavy burden of
''necessity."
The more appropriate burden for an employer to carry, upon
proof of adverse impact of a criteria, is that suggested by interpreta-
tions of similar language in the Equal Pay Act, a burden of proving
"business reasonableness." Applying such a standard, the employer
must carry a burden of persuasion, proving that the "factor" exists
and is entirely age neutral. The employer must further show that
the factor is factually related to bona fide business purposes. Fi-
nally, the employer should be able to prove that the factor is bona
fide in that its use does not undercut some of the basic purposes of
the ADEA, by being based upon group cost factors l0 s or stereotypi-
cal assumptions as to relative abilities.101
103. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(f) (1982); City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 713, 717 n.32 (1978); EEOC v. Bordens, Inc., 551 F. Supp.
1095 (D. Ariz. 1982).
104. Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983).
1284 [Vol. 14
HeinOnline  -- 14 U. Tol. L. Rev. 1284 1982-1983
